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Abstract
The Death Penalty: Attributability, Accountability,
and the Capacity for Self-Correction
Julia Feron
Committee Members: Dr. Marilie Coetsee, Dr. Thad Williamson, Dr. Terry Price
My thesis argues that just as the 'insanity' defense makes it appropriate for courts to excuse
people from punishments, facts about people's upbringings--and the characters that those
upbringings give rise to--may make it appropriate for courts to excuse people from punishments
that they may otherwise have been justifiably subject to. When people are arbitrarily subject to
bad upbringings that produce bad character traits, and when those character traits then lead them
to commit crimes that would otherwise be punishable by death, the death penalty is not
appropriate. First, I explore moral responsibility as it relates to character and actions that arise
from character. Second, I argue that whether or not we can distinguish between those who are
morally responsible for their character and those who are not, we can distinguish between them
from the standpoint of political philosophy and how they should be held legally accountable for
their actions. Finally, I consider the utilitarian objection that the death penalty is needed for its
deterrence value. I respond with the claim that a deterrence justification for the death penalty is





This past March, Virginia became the first Southern state in the U.S to abolish the death
penalty. The legislation passed at a crucial moment in history, among conversations surrounding1
the Black Lives Matter movement and large scale criminal justice reform. The conversations
surronding the abolishment of the death penalty in Virginia, as well as on a national scale,
illuminate a significant issue with capital punishment: arbitrariness. Those arguing in favor of
abolishing the death penalty point to the dispropportionate number of Black men on death row
and cite studies that illuminate the arbitrariness of these numbers. As Michelle Alexander2
explains in The New Jim Crow, “... the Baldus study… found that defendants charged with
killing white victims received the death penalty eleven times more often than defendants charged
with killing black victims. Georgia prosecutors… sought the death penalty in 70 percent of cases
involving black defendants and white victims, but only 19 percent of cases involving white
defendants and black victims”.3
My thesis will discuss a lesser known aspect of arbitrariness as it pertains to the death
penalty: character. Typically, we think of character as something that is non-arbitrary, or under
one’s own ‘control’. The thought is that we are responsible for developing our character and
subsequently the actions that occur as a result of it. However, character is developed and deeply
influenced by the life circumstances of an individual, such as instances of past abuse. In fact, as I
3 Cited in Alexander (2010) p. 107: McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 327 (1989), Brennan, J., dissenting.
2 Ibid. “Opponents of the death penalty cite the high cost, the possibility of executing the innocent and the
disproportionate racial impact. Black defendants are more likely to face death sentences, especially when victims are
white.”
1 Evans, W. (2021, March 24). Virginia governor Signs LAW abolishing the death penalty, a 1st in the south.




describe in more detail in Chapter 2, studies have shown that past instances of abuse significantly
increase the likelihood of future criminal activity, and a disproportionate number of inmates on4
death row have experienced abuse during their childhood or adolescence. It is plausible to5
assume that the traumatic experiences of abuse during childhood years influenced these
individuals’ characters, particularly the sorts of character traits that may lead one to commit a
capital offense.  Moreover, this sort of influence over character is not exclusive to past instances
of abuse. Other life circumstances such as educational attainment or experiencing poverty also
influence the sort of character an individual develops. As I will explain, whether or not one has
these kinds of life experiences is often arbitrary. Individuals do not choose whether or not they
will experience physical or sexual abuse during their childhood. I will claim that due to the
arbitrariness of these life experiences that influence an individual's character development,
crimes committed as a result of certain character traits may require mitigated consequences. I
will break down character into two elements: the cognitive and the motivational. As will be
explained, either or both of these elements may be deficient based on the influence of arbitrary
factors. Ultimately, I will argue that the morally arbitrary attributes that contribute to character
render the death penalty a morally impermissible method of punishment.
In order to argue against the death penalty in the manner detailed above, I will reference
different theories of punishment. Historically, a major argument for the death penalty has been
retributivist in nature and relies on the philosophical concept of ‘just deserts’ or lex tallions. A6
retributivist theory of punishment has roots in Kantian ethics: some argue that Kant’s
6 Pojman, L. P., & Reiman, J. H. (1998). The death penalty: For and against. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
5 Childhood trauma prevalent among death row inmates. (2015, July 10). Retrieved March 03, 2021, from
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/news/childhood-trauma-prevalent-among-death-row-inmates.
4 Cunningham, M. D., & Vigen, M. P. (2002). Death row inmate characteristics, adjustment, and confinement: A
critical review of the literature. Behavioral Sciences & the Law, 20(1-2), 191-210. doi:10.1002/bsl.473.
5
interpretation of the categorical imperative supports the use of the death penalty as a form of
punishment. Retributivists are concerned with what a wrongdoer deserves based on the wrong7
inflicted rather than the consequences of that wrong. While the retributivists’ focus on just
deserts is important, the first chapter of my thesis will argue that people do not necessarily
‘deserve’ the death penalty as a punishment for certain crimes in the sense that they are - at least
potentially - not morally responsible for the criminal acts committed.
One significant contribution of my thesis is showing how we can transcend the larger
debate about moral responsibility and free will and instead consider political philosophy as a
method of addressing the question of punishment as it pertains to capital punishment. In the
second chapter, I argue for using a Rawlsian framework to rise above the debate about moral
responsibility and instead focus on analyzing how characteristics that are irrelevant to a person's
equal standing as a citizen influence the likelihood of an individual to commit a crime, and the
consequences of that for just punishment. I will draw on Sharon Dolvich and Chad Flander’s
work to illuminate the pitfalls of the retributive approach and argue for a rehabilitative theory of
punishment that precludes the use of the death penalty.
Finally, in Chapter 3, I will consider a utilitarian argument in favor of the death penalty,
which will be found wanting. Two versions of the utilitarian argument will be presented: one that
is compatible with the Rawlsian framework discussed in Chapter 2 and one that offers an entirely
different approach that does not take a Rawlsian framework into account. The first,
Rawlsian-based version of a utilitarian argument holds that even behind the veil of ignorance
7 “The necessity of executing murderers follows from Kant’s claim that there is a categorical requirement to impose
the (permissible) punishments picked out by the ius talionis.” Yost, B. S. (2010). Kant's justification of the death
penalty reconsidered. Kantian Review, 15(2), 1-27. doi:10.1017/s1369415400002417.
6
individuals would want to keep in mind certain pragmatic considerations such as safety and law
and order, and considers the value of deterrence in promoting these ends. However, from behind
the veil individuals would also want to ensure that their ability to develop and pursue their
conceptions of the good and capacities for a sense of justice are not unduly hindered. Due to the
potential for individuals to be perpetrators of crime once the veil is removed (and therefore
objects of punishment) and since harsh punishments, like death, prevent someone from
recovering from their punishment and continuing to pursue their conception of the good, I argue
that they would not be agreed to from behind the veil.
Even if one rejects the Rawlsian framework altogether and opts for a purely utilitarian
approach, it remains the case that the deterrence model of punishment is not apt to be effective at
attaining its goal of discouraging criminal acts or behavior. This is because for those who do not
have a capacity for self-correction, or the ability to recognize undesirable character traits and
work to correct them, an impending threat of punishment will not be effective at impelling them
to correct their character. In other words, they will not be deterred. Without the capacity for
self-correction, one cannot be properly discouraged from undesirable behaviors or criminal
activities as one is unable to conceptualize and effectively pursue the changes to character that
would be required to avoid punishment. I will argue that for many individuals who end up on
death row, their ‘meta-’character trait of being able to correct their character may be
compromised by the life circumstances they face. As a result, I claim that deterrence value will
be ineffective and is an insufficient justification for the death penalty, even by purely utilitarian
standards.
7
I will conclude my thesis by addressing the questions about justice and mercy that arise
when considering certain arbitrary influences on people’s characters as mitigating factors for
punishments. Much of the existing literature surrounding theories of punishment refers to the
consideration of difficult life circumstances, like a history of abuse - which may negatively
influence character - in the course of deciding punishment as an act of mercy. However, based on
the conclusions drawn from my thesis, it would seem that considering such factors - and, in
particular, the character deficiencies that they result in - when doling out punishments is a matter
of justice. This has important implications for future conversations about punishment, as it points
towards a rehabilitative system of punishment as required by justice, rather than as a mere act of
mercy on the part of the sentencer.
8
Chapter One
In order to understand how character deficiencies that impact an individual's decision to
commit a crime should be understood, it is helpful to consider how mental illness functions in
our current criminal justice system. So consider the following case: On February 23rd, 2010
Bruco Eastwood drove to Deer Creek Middle School in Colorado and shot two students resulting
in serious injuries. During Eastwoods trial, three psychiatrists took the stand to explain that the8
defendant was insane, and therefore “not guilty by reason of insanity”. The psychiatrists testified
to Eastwood’s history of mental illness and explained that despite having been hospitalized and
diagnosed with schizophrenia, he did not continue his medication upon his release and went
untreated for years. The jury agreed with the “not guilty by reason of insanity” claim and9
Eastwood was committed to a mental institution.
The insanity defense is defined in §4.01 of the Modern Penal Code and states that a
defendant cannot be held responsible for his crime if a mental disease means he “... did not
possess a ‘substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform
his conduct to the requirements of the law’”. A defendant is ruled not responsible, and therefore10
not guilty by reason of insanity, if his mental ailment results in him being unable to understand
right from wrong or unable to control the impulses he has that result in crimes.
10 Ibid.
9 Findlaw. 2020. Findlaw's Colorado Court Of Appeals Case And Opinions.. [online] Available at:
<https://caselaw.findlaw.com/co-court-of-appeals/1716323.html> [Accessed 4 October 2020].
8 Roberts, Michael. “Bruco Eastwood found not guilty by reason of insanity in Deer Creek Middle School shooting.”
westword.com, 6 October 2011,
https://www.westword.com/news/bruco-eastwood-found-not-guilty-by-reason-of-insanity-in-deer-creek-middle-scho
ol-shooting-5881974. Accessed 4 October 2020.
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The jury’s decision in Eastwood’s case seems right to us. The law recognizes a principle
that we intuitively see the plausibility of, which explains why we think that the jury’s acceptance
of the insanity defense is permissible in Eastwood’s case. Society can agree that mental illness
can distort someone’s ability to determine right from wrong and act in accordance with that
determination. We also agree that as a result someone like Eastwood, who suffered from a
serious mental illness, does not have complete responsibility for his actions. It is my belief that
society’s use of the insanity defense can be extended even further to reevaluate how we hold
individuals legally culpable for aspects of their character. In particular, I will analyze the
underlying justifications of the insanity defense and draw an analogy between the roles of mental
illnesses and character in assessing legal accountability. Just as cognitive and motivational
deficits caused by mental illness can excuse us from legal culpability, cognitive and motivational
deficits resulting in character issues should also mitigate legal responsibility.
In this chapter, I begin by considering this issue from the angle of moral responsibility. I
will explore how a character defense might mitigate moral responsibility and I will also discuss
the challenges that accompany this conclusion. In the following chapter, I suggest that as a result
of these difficulties we should transcend the larger debate surrounding moral responsibility and
turn towards political philosophy in order to focus on a framework that does not require difficult
questions about moral responsibility to be answered as definitively.
I. The Insanity Defense Comparison
Inherent in the insanity defense is the recognition that certain diminished capacities
mitigate the amount of responsibility one has for their actions. There are two kinds of diminished
10
capacities that the penal code outlines: cognitive and motivational. The cognitive component
refers to the ability of an individual to have more or less accurate judgements about what is right
and “appreciate the criminality” of certain actions. For instance, schizophrenia impairs an
individual's judgements about reality and what is right or wrong. Schizophrenia also interferes11
with the motivational component of an individual’s moral responsibility. The motivational
component is the ability to act on one’s judgements about what is right, or as it is described in the
legal code “to conform conduct”. In the case of schizophrenia, schizophrenics are often unable to
control their impulses. It is because an individual with schizophrenia suffers motivational and
cognitive deficiencies that we think she has mitigated responsibility for her actions.
The cognitive and motivational elements that play into mental illness also play into
character. For the purposes of this thesis I will treat character as the disposition to behave, think,
and feel in certain ways, similar to the manner in which Aristotle discusses virtues. More
specifically, to have a character trait is to be disposed to think, act and feel in particular patterns
in response to particular kinds of circumstances. Much like certain mental health conditions, bad
character traits operate either or both by impeding an individual’s ability to tell right from wrong
and (/or) impeding her ability to control impulses. To explain this even further, to have ‘bad’12
character is, in part, to be disposed to think that there are sufficient reasons for doing things that
12 Mental illness and character are not exactly alike, and the line between them can sometimes become fuzzy. Some
might argue that upcoming hypothetical examples are mental health issues rather than character issues. While there
may very well be mental health issues at play in these situations, both issues have similar casual roles. For the
purposes of this paper, I will not attempt to draw an exact connection between character and mental illness, but
rather point out that character issues can play the same role as mental health issues in terms of how it affects the
cognitive and motivational components of moral responsibility. Character relates to both the ability to have decent
judgements about what is right and the ability to act on the judgements about what is right.
11 “Psychotic symptoms include altered perceptions (e.g., changes in vision, hearing, smell, touch, and taste),
abnormal thinking, and odd behaviors. People with psychotic symptoms may lose a shared sense of reality and
experience themselves and the world in a distorted way” Schizophrenia. Retrieved January 30, 2021, from
https://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/topics/schizophrenia/index.shtml.
11
there are in fact morally overriding reasons not to do. Perhaps one thinks that there is a reason to
hurt someone because of something they did, when in fact there are morally overriding reasons
not to do so. Additionally or alternatively,  to have ‘bad’ character may be to be disposed to not
feel motivated to do what one has morally overriding reasons to do (even if, perhaps, one
recognizes in some abstract sense that one ought to do it). On the other hand, to have ‘good’
character would be, in part, to appreciate the right reasons for doing things and to be motivated
to do those things. Thus, having a ‘good’ character involves acting on those right reasons. For
instance, Shafer-Landau (2012) describes the virtue of generosity and compares the thought
processes and motivations of a generous person versus a stingy person. Shafer-Landau points13
out the different motives that a stingy person has in comparison to a generous one , which lends14
itself to the cognitive and motivational elements that make up character. The cognitive element is
being able to determine that you should do one thing rather than another in a circumstance and
appreciate the reasons for doing so. To use Shafer-Landau’s example, a generous person might
see a homeless man on the street and recognize that he is in need and that she should offer
assistance. Then, the motivational element of character comes into play, which refers to the
motivation one has to act on the prior assessment of what is ‘right’ to do. The generous person is
motivated to do the ‘right’ thing (as she is able to cognitively recognize and appreciate what the
‘right’ thing is) and offers the homeless man food, whereas a stingy person would not recognise
14 Ibid. “Consider first… generosity. A generous person will often have different perceptions from a stingy person…
a generous person has different thoughts from those of an ungenerous person… a generous person’s motives will
differ from those of a stingy person…”.
13Although Shafer-Landau discusses virtues in his piece, he points out the relationship between virtues and character
traits which makes his example relevant to this thesis: “A virtue is a character trait”. Shafer-Landau, R. (2012).
Ethical Pluralism and Absolute Moral Rules. In The fundamentals of ethics (2nd ed.). New York: Oxford University
Press.
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and/or be motivated by the ‘right’ reasons and pass by the homeless man without offering any
aid.
To better see how these ideas apply to particular cases of wrong-doing, consider two
examples. First, for the cognitive component of character consider the example of a parent and
his decision to use corporal punishment to discipline his child. The parent was disciplined by his
own parents in this way, and therefore grew up in an environment where corporal punishment
was accepted as a justifiable consequence for bad behavior. In this case, the parent  develops a
skewed sense of right and wrong in terms of acceptable forms of punishment and this gives rise
to the development of the bad character trait of cruelty. This bad trait of cruelty, issuing from
childhood experiences, impairs the cognitive element of the parent’s character. Since the parent
is unable to make proper judgements due to his character deficiencies, we would hold him less
responsible for his actions than if he was able to properly judge right from wrong. Much like the
individual with schizophrenia, the parent’s moral responsibility is mitigated because of the effect
that his bad character traits have on his cognitive ability to rationalize the permissibility of his
decisions.
On the motivational side of character, consider an individual who is unable to control
certain desires that she has, even if she can understand that the desire is wrong. This would be an
instance of an individual whose character lacks the motivational component of moral
responsibility. A basic example could be the following: A mother is in a store with her toddler
and the toddler becomes upset over a toy he wants. The mother tries to calm her child down, but
the child continues to scream and cry. Eventually, because the mother is already dealing with her
own hunger and her task of finding food around the store, her emotional resources for resisting
13
her temptation to yell are depleted and the mother lashes out and shouts at her toddler to be quiet.
Rationally, the mother is aware that she should not be raising her voice at her young child who
does not know any better, but in her moment of frustration, she cannot resist the urge to silence
him by yelling. This illustrates a basic example of how a person may be able to recognize a
desire or action as wrong, but be unable to overcome the impulse to do so. In philosophy, this
“weakness of will” is referred to as akrasia.15
Since bad character appears to play a similar causal role in people’s psychology as mental
health, and given that we allow people “off the hook” for mental health issues, it seems we
should also mitigate responsibility for bad character. The above examples begin to illustrate this:
intuitively the mother and father in the last examples have a degree of mitigated responsibility
for their actions. However, one might be hesitant to accept that this could also be the case for
very serious and heinous ‘bad’ actions, like capital crimes. In order to see why mitigated
responsibility may also apply in cases of capital crimes , consider the example of Sarah.
When Sarah was a young girl, she experienced sexual and physical abuse at the hands of
her father. The abuse that she experienced during her childhood led her to develop certain ‘bad’
character traits and prevented her from developing other ‘good’ character traits. In particular the
abuse resulted in Sarah developing bad character traits, such as aggression and misanthropy. The
abuse also hindered Sarah’s development of good character traits, like self-restraint. When she
got older her misanthropic nature, aggressiveness, and lack of self-restraint resulted in her
inability to overcome her impulse to shoot her boyfriend during an argument. It is obvious that
Sarah did something wrong. However, cognitively she was unable to recognize the overriding
15 Stroud, S., &amp; Svirsky, L. (2019, September 04). Weakness of Will. Retrieved January 30, 2021, from
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/weakness-will/.
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reasons that existed not to shoot her boyfriend due to the misanthropy and aggression that led her
to believe violence is the only way that she can protect herself. Motivationally, even if she was
aware that in the abstract killing someone is wrong, her fear of being harmed again led her to be
unable to curb the aggressive defensiveness that caused her to lash out. The character traits that
she developed from her experiences with her father’s abuse meant that when confronted with a
situation where her boyfriend was acting aggressively towards her, her motivational capacities
were severely impaired. Sarah’s motivational deficiency means that she is unable to refrain from
acting on her misanthropic, aggressive impulses. The impairment of Sarah’s motivational
component of character is similar to a schizophrenic’s motivational deficiencies in that both
result in the agent experiencing akrasia.
Both mental health issues and character traits act similarly in their ability to impair
someone’s capacities to control his/her motivations and make good judgments. Therefore, there
is a prima facie parity: if you accept the insanity defense, then you should accept some sort of
character defense. The insanity defense mitigates an individual's moral responsibility for an act
when a mental impairment significantly impacts that individual’s cognitive and motivational
components. Since we allow this sort of defense for those who suffer from mental illnesses and
character plays a similar casual role, then we should also allow a character defense that mitigates
a person’s responsibility on the basis of bad character.
II. Family of Intrinsic Responsibility Objections
The following section of this paper will seek to address two objections concerning
intrinsic responsibility for character that suggest individuals should not have mitigated
15
responsibility as a result of bad character. The first objection, the Control Objection, addresses
the downstream effects of responsibility for certain actions by suggesting that people like Sarah
are responsible for actions that flow from their character since they have control over the
development of that character. The second objection, the Self-Revision Objection, suggests that
individuals like Sarah are responsible for their character because of their capacity to self-revise
their character, even if that character was initially formed by influences that they did not have
control over.
The Control Objection:
Some will object to the argument of the previous section with the assertion that character
is something individuals have control over, while mental illnesses are something individuals do
not have control over. The idea that we have control over our character makes it seem like we
should be responsible for its downstream effects in a way that we are not responsible for the
downstream effects of mental illness. In that respect, these critics view character issues like a
hypothetical case of drunk driving or general misbehavior: we are responsible for the actions that
flow from our character in the same way that a drunk driver is responsible for the actions that
flow from his drunkenness. Even if, once drunk, a driver is not directly responsible for his
actions, he is indirectly responsible for them because of his decision to become drunk.16
Similarly, even if Sarah would not be directly responsible for her actions, given the pre-existence
of the character trait of aggression, she is indirectly responsible for them due to her failure to
exercise self-discipline in regulating her development of the character trait of aggression in the
first place.
16 In this hypothetical case of drunk driving we are assuming that addiction/ substance abuse issues are not playing a
role in the situation, as that could result in a different assessment.
16
The Tracing Objection:
Consider our hypothetical drunk driver, Alex. Alex is attending a party at a friend’s house
where he knows he will drink alcohol. However, Alex does not make alternative transportation
plans for after the party. With this knowledge, Alex's evening can be broken down into three
parts: (1) Alex chooses to drink without planning a sober ride home, (2) due to his drunken state,
Alex ends up driving home under the influence, and (3) Alex crashes into another car on the
road.
To better understand the way in which Alex is responsible for the car crash, we can refer
to Zheng’s (2016) and Fischer and Ravizza’s (1998) discussion of “tracing cases”. Tracing cases
refer to scenarios where “... an agent is indirectly responsible for some action because it can be
traced back to other actions for which she is directly responsible”. The drunk driving example17
seems to be a tracing case in the sense that part (3), Alex not having control over his actions and
crashing into another car, can be traced back to part (1), Alex’s free (controlled) decision to get
drunk without securing a sober ride home.
Now, let’s compare Alex’s case of drunk driving to our previous example of Sarah in
order to determine whether or not Sarah can be held responsible for killing her boyfriend in the
same way Alex can be held responsible for the car crash. In order to do so we can break down
Sarah’s example into three parts: (1) Sarah fails to exercise self-discipline in regulating her
aggression, (2) Sarah fights with her boyfriend under the influence of her aggression, and (3)
Sarah kills her boyfriend. Someone advancing the Tracing Objection might argue that Sarah’s
‘choice’ to become aggressive parallels Alex’s choice to get drunk without planning alternative
17 Zheng, Robin. (2016). Attributability, Accountability, and Implicit Bias.
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198766179.003.0004.
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transportation and that Sarah killing her boyfriend acts as Alex’s car crash. Part (3), Sarah killing
her boyfriend, can be traced back to part (1), Sarah’s choice to indulge in her aggressive
character. As a result, it may be argued that Sarah is responsible for her actions in the way that
Alex is.`
The Tracing Objection assumes that someone’s character is ‘up to them’ in the way that
Alex’s choice to get drunk without securing a ride home is ‘up to him’. However, this is not
always the case. For instance, in Sarah’s case from earlier her character may not have been ‘up to
her’. Unlike Alex’s choice to get drunk without planning a ride, the abuse Sarah suffered during
her formative years was not within her control, and that abuse directly led to her development of
bad character traits. Therefore, Sarah is not responsible for the character she developed in the
way that the drunk driver is responsible for his decision to enter a state of drunkenness without
having alternative plans. Moreover, the drunk driver, whether through school teachings or
commercials that warn against the dangers of drunk driving, was aware that driving under the
influence is the wrong thing to do. Even with this knowledge, the drunk driver still made the
decision to drink alcohol without planning a sober ride. In Sarah’s case, however, her father
never taught her to “think before indulging in anger”. Thus, just as Sarah’s actions are reflective
of her character, Sarah’s character is also a reflection of something outside of herself.
The Self-Revision Objection:
Someone might object that if Sarah is not responsible, then none of us are. I have claimed
that Sarah’s cognitive and motivational deficiencies which result in her bad character should
serve as mitigating factors in terms of her responsibility for her actions. But cognitive and
motivational deficiencies that influence character can apply to all of us, which would mean that
18
we are also entitled to a sort of mitigated responsibility. Philosophical incompatibilists often
express this kind of argument as an argument about determinism. According to determinists, all
events in our lives, including the choices that we make, are completely determined by prior
events. Philosophical incompatibilists hold that insofar as determinism is true - and so insofar as
all of our characters (including in particular our cognitive and motivational deficiencies) are
determined by forces outside of our own control - we cannot be held morally responsible for our
characters or the actions that occur as a result of them.
Compatibilists seek to remedy the tension between determinism and moral responsibility.
They argue that determinism is compatible with responsibility because and insofar as your
actions are the result of causes that reside in you. Gary Watson, for instance, argues that if an18
action is caused by your own values or reflected in your valuational system, you are responsible
for said action. To illustrate, contrast an individual under the influence of hypnotism with an19
individual who is not. When under the influence of hypnosis, one’s actions and choices are
dictated by a force that is not connected to one’s own basic values. As a result, a compatibilist
like Gary Watson would excuse that individual from moral responsibility over actions that
occurred under the state of hypnosis. However, ordinary individuals who are not acting under the
influence of hypnosis and instead act upon the values that reside within themselves are
responsible. Since their actions are caused by their own valuational system, compatibilists like
Watson consider them responsible for those actions. In terms of the case of the drunk driver,
Watson’s compatibilist argument would say he is responsible for getting himself into the mental
state of drunkenness because he (1) had a desire to have a fun evening unencumbered by having
19 Watson, Gary (1975). “Free Agency”, Journal of Philosophy LXXII.
18 McKenna, Michael and D. Justin Coates, "Compatibilism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter
2020 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2020/entries/compatibilism/>.
19
to make plans and (2) this desire reflects the drunk driver’s larger values of a care free lifestyle.
The drunk driver made the choice to consume alcohol and subsequently drive a car which
reflected his desires and valuational system. Therefore, he can be held morally responsible for
the consequences of his drunk driving.
On the surface, Watson’s argument seems to vindicate what we generally think about
responsibility. However, this argument also seems to imply that Sarah is responsible. It looks as
though Sarah’s actions are caused by something that in some sense 'resides in her’, her values,
which in this case are values of aggression. So, if I want to differentiate Sarah from the rest of us,
I still need to explain what that difference consists in.
What exactly differentiates Sarah from the rest of us? Charles Taylor gives us another
way that we can understand the compatibilist thesis in order to help answer this question: Many
of us have the capacity to self-revise our values, and in turn our character, whereas Sarah does
not. Self-revision is the ability for an individual to reflect on the values and character traits they20
possess in order to determine whether or not those character traits are ones that are reflective of
their deeper values. Pursuant to this view, what differentiates someone like Sarah from21
someone like Alex is that Alex has the capacity to self-revise his carefree lifestyle, whereas
Sarah does not have the capacity to self-revise her aggressive character trait.
21 “In one way or another, all these philosophers seem to be saying that the key to responsibility lies in the fact that
responsible agents are those for whom it is not just the case that their actions are within the control of their wills, but
also the case that their wills are within the control of their selves in some deeper sense…we may speak of their
separate positions as variations of one basic view about responsibility: the deep-self view.” Wolf, S. (1988). Sanity
and the metaphysics of responsibility. Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions.
doi:10.1017/cbo9780511625411.003
20 Taylor, Charles (1976). "Responsibility for Self," in A E, Rorty, ed The Identities of Persons. Berkeley: University
of California Press.
20
While Taylor provides us with a good starting point for distinguishing Sarah and Alex,
Susan Wolf takes her argument a step beyond Taylor’s and argues that while self-revision is
necessary for responsibility, it is not sufficient. In order to be responsible for your actions you
need to be able to revise your character (to align with your deeper values), but also, more
specifically, you must revise your character to reflect the ‘right’ values so as to correct your
character. This means you need access to the objectively right reasons: Alex not only needs to22
be able to self-revise his carefree lifestyle but he must also be able to self-revise his care-free
lifestyle in the correct direction.
Wolf uses the example of JoJo, the son of an evil dictator, to illustrate the importance of
self-correction over mere self-revisability : JoJo is raised and educated by his sadistic father and23
develops similar values as him. Therefore, when JoJo is an adult he models many of the same
evil behaviors that his father did. He commits evil acts as a result of his own desires, which he
wants to have. Therefore, it would seem that JoJo is responsible for his actions as they are
reflective of his deeper values. Wolf points out the flaw in this interpretation by drawing
attention to JoJo’s upbringing and the idea that even if JoJo did try to self-revise, he did not have
access to the objectively right reasons necessary to self-correct. So, Wolf introduces the sane
deep self view, arguing that sanity is the ability to “normatively recognize and appreciate the
world for what it is”. It is this ability to self-correct in a direction that allows us to see the world24
for what it actually is that lends us responsibility over our actions, as seeing the world for what it






I will talk about self-correcting as the ability to revise one’s character based on an
understanding of the moral reasons that exist to act in one way as opposed to another. This
results in the development of some character traits over others. In order to have a capacity for
self-correction, one must have certain ‘meta’ cognitive and motivational capacities. In the case of
self-correction, the ‘meta’ cognitive element refers to the understanding of something as the
correct moral standard, the recognition of yourself as not reaching that moral standard, and the
appreciation of the reasons one should reach it. The ‘meta’ motivational component of self
correction concerns the ability to take those reasons as the motivation to change and speaks to
one’s ability to direct their emotional energy to close the gap that exists between themselves and
the moral standard by working against old conditioned habits.
To see how self-correction functions, contrast Sarah with Sam. Suppose that Sarah and
Sam both develop aggressive tendencies as young children, but as they grow Sam’s parents
provide him with a nurturing atmosphere, send him to counseling, and try to teach him the value
of self-discipline. At eighteen, Sam has developed the capacity to self-reflect on his values and
revise them in the direction of self-discipline. As a result, whether he chooses to make that
change or not, he becomes responsible for later actions because he had the opportunity to make
that change. If he kills someone out of aggression, he is responsible due to his capacity to revise
and correct his aggressive tendencies.
Sarah is not like Sam, even though initially it might look like Sarah does have the
capacity for self-correction. Perhaps she watches what aggression causes her father to do. Then,
one might argue, she should be able to recognize that indulging in anger leads to bad things
which should encourage her to revise her own aggressive behaviour. However, in Sarah’s case
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she was not presented with the possibility of incorporating self-correction into her valuational
system. Sarah may not have the cognitive element of self-correction (i.e recognizing what
self-correction is, how to self-correct, when to self reflect, etc.). Even more specifically, Sarah
may not be able to self-correct because she does not have access or the opportunity to recognize
the value of self-discipline, and therefore does not have the capacity to self-correct in the
direction of self-discipline. Additionally, even if Sarah was able to understand the value of
self-discipline in an abstract sense (perhaps she sees students with self-discipline being rewarded
at school), she may not be able to see the value of it for herself. Even if she sees benefits in some
cases (like at school), she is not aware of how she can obtain those benefits within the context of
her own life circumstances. Maybe self-discipline seems unattainable or too difficult to acquire
which results in a lack of motivational capacity to act on a need for self-correction.
III. Family of ‘Meta’ Objections
It is clear that if Sarah is not morally responsible, then she should not be held accountable
in the same way as someone who was given or has access to the tools for self-revision. However,
someone might still object that there is not a significant difference between Sarah and others
because incompatibilism is still true generally. In this section, I will argue that for someone who
thought this, there is another way to reach an understanding of accountability that mitigates
Sarah’s responsibility.
Responsibility lies with the capacity to correct one’s character, which Sarah does not
have, but perhaps I do. That would mean that I am to be held responsible for my actions. But
consider the possibility that even if I have the capacity to revise, it is predetermined whether or
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not I will use that capacity. If I do not use that capacity and subsequently act poorly, that action is
predetermined. Then it would seem that I should not be held responsible for my action, since a
predetermined action is outside of my own control. So, it still remains that case that maybe none
of us should be held responsible for our actions.
For many this conclusion is troublesome, as accepting the notion that character is out of
an individual’s control allows people to “get off the hook” for almost anything. If it is true that
people should not be held morally responsible for elements outside of their control and character
traits, and how they act on them, fall under that category, then anyone with a character issue may
be exempt from moral responsibility. Since many people suffer from some sort of character
issue, then perhaps no one can be held morally responsible for anything: there may still be no
way to distinguish between Sarah’s responsibility for her actions and the responsibility that the
rest of us have for our actions.
How can we respond to this sort of hard-line incompatibilist position? One way to
respond to this worry about consequences is to simply “bite the bullet” and accept that people are
never morally responsible for bad behavior. But ‘biting the bullet’ in this way comes at
significant costs, at least apparently, because it conflicts with the intuition that people like Sam
should be subject to consequences for their bad character and wrongful actions, and in particular
that Sam may seem appropriately subject to different penalties than Sarah. How do we justify
doling out consequences for undesirable or harmful actions if no one can be held responsible for
those actions? Moreover, can that justification explain why Sarah should be subject to different
consequences than Sam?
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In order to properly understand how even a hardline incompatibilist might distinguish
between Sarah and Sam, let’s consider the distinction between moral blameworthiness and moral
accountability. There is some plausibility in saying that someone is not morally blameworthy25
due to factors outside of their control. Recognizing this lack of blameworthiness in certain cases
allows us to hold onto another thing that many people find important when deciding issues of
moral responsibility, that is, holding people accountable for their actions. An individual can be
held accountable for an action, or responsible for rectifying the effects of it, without being
blameworthy for said action. As Zheng (2012) explains, although we do not hold a driver
morally blameworthy for a car crash that occurs as a result of black ice, we still hold them
accountable for the accident in that they must remedy the wrongs that occurred as a result of the
accident. It is important that someone be held responsible for the consequences of the accident26
(financial, medical, etc.) even if we do not hold them morally blameworthy for the accident.
More broadly, accountability is important for utilitarian reasons, as it can teach lessons, act as a
deterrent, or provide closure for those affected negatively. Practically speaking, accountability is
important since it allows society to remedy wrongdoings without making a judgement of moral
blameworthiness.
Accountability is important in the manner outlined above regardless of whether or not
one agrees with the compatibilist or incompatibilist argument. Accountability offers an avenue
for individuals to be held legally accountable for certain actions without holding them morally
responsible for character deficines outside of their own control. Even if you agree with the
26 Ibid.
25 Zheng, Robin. (2016). Attributability, Accountability, and Implicit Bias.
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198766179.003.0004.
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incompatibilist line of reasoning, you can still recognize the role that accountability plays in
determining consequences.
Ultimately, accountability is the primary interest of this thesis: I will claim that,
regardless of whether we take a compatibilist or incompatibilist position about moral
blameworthiness, there are certain ways in which it is not appropriate for someone like Sarah to
be held accountable for the actions that flow from her bad character. Once we focus on
accountability rather than moral blameworthiness, the role of the state in assigning consequences
for actions becomes especially salient. Unfortunately, the legal code itself does not currently
make a strong distinction between moral culpability and legal accountability.
It is clear that the connection between character and moral responsibility brings many
valid questions regarding free will and agency to the surface. In order to transcend these broader
questions of how character relates to moral responsibility and how much of it is legitimately
under our own control, this paper will focus on political philosophy. I am ultimately interested in
what the state should do about this problem, that is to say to what degree can the government and
legal system hold us accountable for actions that occur as a result of impaired cognitive or
motivational deficiencies that influence character. In order to answer this question, the next
section of this chapter will look to John Rawls and his social contract theory.
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Chapter 2
In the last chapter, we discussed two routes to accountability: one in response to
compatibilist arguments, such as Gary Watson’s, and the other in response to incompatibilists. In
this chapter, I discuss a political philosophy framework for accountability that draws on the
theory of John Rawls. From behind Rawls’ veil of ignorance we would decide how the27
government can hold us responsible for crimes we commit. In order for each person to be able to
effectively pursue her own conception of the good, there must be a degree of safety and order in
society. Thus, it is plausible to assume that individuals would consent to some sort of criminal
justice system that doles out consequences for those who do not follow rules. In this section,28
I’ll explore what kind of consequences we would agree to from behind the veil of ignorance.
After I discuss the Rawlsian framework, I will draw on Sharon Dolovich and Chad Flanders’s
arguments concerning the moral arbitrariness of temptations for criminal behavior to argue that
the death penalty would not be agreed to from behind the veil of ignorance. I will detail various
respects in which the proclivity to commit capital crimes is morally arbitrary. Then, I will
address a utilitarian objection to the Rawlsian framework as it pertains to the death penalty.
Lastly, I will respond to this utilitarian objection in two parts in order to argue in favor of
mitigating consequences for individuals with character deficiencies.
I. Rawlsian Framework
Rawls’ theory of political philosophy begins by placing members of society behind a
hypothetical veil of ignorance. From the “original position” behind the veil, individuals are
28 Ibid.
27 Rawls, J. (1971). A theory of justice. Belknap Press/Harvard University Press.
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unaware of their religious and philosophical worldviews, or conceptions of the good, as well as29
their positions in society--e.g. their socioeconomic status, gender, race or ethnicity. It is also true
that from behind the veil we would not be aware of our philosophical views, particularly whether
we have incompatibilist or compatibilist views. From the perspective of a Rawlsian, it would be
wrong to make a theory of punishment dependent on a particular view of compatibilism or
incompatibilism. Since we are not aware of the position we take on that matter from behind the
veil, we would not want punishment to be predicated on a particular interpretation of it.
The reasons Rawls thinks that individuals from behind the veil of ignorance should not
know information like this is because he considers those elements of a person’s identity to be
morally arbitrary attributes, or aspects of an individual that are irrelevant to his or her status as a
free and equal citizen. In our capacity as citizens, you and I have equal moral standing,30
regardless of factors like our socio-economic status, our religion, or our philosophical
viewpoints. According to Rawls, hiding these morally arbitrary attributes allows people to make
unbiased decisions about what rules they are willing to accept for society. Behind the veil of
ignorance, individuals can consent to rules about what the government can and cannot enforce
without irrelevant personal biases influencing their decisions. Because the veil of ignorance
removes irrelevant personal biases from the decision-making process, Rawls believes that the
veil of ignorance represents a fair procedure for deciding what rules we should impose on
society.
Behind the veil of ignorance, individuals want to ensure that they will have a basis for
developing and maintaining a sense of self-respect, regardless of their place within society once
30 Ibid.
29 Freeman, S. (2019, April 03). Original position. Retrieved February 16, 2021, from
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/original-position/.
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the veil is removed. Rawls argues that in order to have a basis for self respect, an individual31
must be able to develop and pursue one’s own conception of the good, as well as develop a
capacity for a sense of justice, or a capacity to understand and be motivated by fair rules
(whatever those turn out to be). He also mentions how certain social and economic foundations32
are necessary in order for individuals to be able to pursue their conceptions of the good or
develop a capacity for a sense of justice. For example, we cannot pursue our conception of the
good without a livable wage or if we are not free to practice our religion publicly. As a result, we
need a government to ensure economic foundations for self-respect, such as a livable wage, and
social foundations for self-respect, such as religious protections.
II. Applying Rawls to Punishment
Although Rawls himself does not discuss how his theory of justice might apply to our
criminal justice system, Sharon Dolovich and Chad Flanders both apply Rawls’s framework to
questions about punishment and the criminal justice system. Dolovich argues that whether or not
someone commits a crime is information that would remain unknown from behind the veil.33
While she does not claim that committing a crime itself is a morally arbitrary attribute, she does
conclude that various attributes which can be seen as morally arbitrary may influence a person to
commit a crime by placing “strong pressures” or “temptations to offend” on that person.34
Dolovich specifically uses the example of past instances of abuse in order to show how that
34 Ibid.





‘attribute’ leads to frustration and aggression that may later result in violence against others.35
Although Dolovich does not go into the specific details of maltreatment and its effects on crime,
it is well documented in literature that experiencing abuse during the formative years of
development increases the likelihood of committing a crime later in life. Moreover, whether or36
not your father abused you as a child is a morally arbitrary attribute, since it is irrelevant to your
status as a free and equal citizen in society. Thus, it is also clear how an attribute that is arbitrary
from the perspective of our standing as equal citizens, such as child abuse, influences your
liklihood of committing a crime. Since morally arbitrary attributes like abuse influence whether
or not you will commit a crime, Dolovich asserts that individuals from behind the veil of
ignorance we would recognize the possibility that we may be arbitrarily subject to pressures or
temptations that lead them to commit crimes. We would therefore take precautions to ensure that
the justice system allowed citizens who were subject to such temptations--and who, plausibly, at
least sometimes gave in to them--to have a social and economic basis for self-respect. In
particular, you would want to ensure that the justice system allows such citizens to develop and
pursue a conception of the good, as well as develop a capacity for a sense of justice.37
37 Ibid.
36 “We find that maltreatment approximately doubles the probability of engaging in many types of crime. Low SES
children are both more likely to be mistreated and suffer more damaging effects… Sexual abuse appears to have the
largest negative effects… Finally, the probability of engaging in crime increases with the experience of multiple
forms of maltreatment as well as the experience of Child Protective Services (CPS) investigation”. Currie, Janet &
Tekin, Erdal. (2006). Does Child Abuse Cause Crime? NBER Working Paper No. w12171, Available at SSRN:
https://ssrn.com/abstract=897025.
35 “... a number of such attributes and personal particulars that could lead their possessors to face strong pressures
and temptations to offend, without the moral or other resources necessary always to be able to resist… for example,
the experience of having been born and raised in a family in which physical and psychological abuse was
commonplace, in which one learned early to express feelings of frustration, resentment, or anger through violence,
and lacked instruction or role models presenting a more respectful and mature way of expressing feelings. Surely
whether or not one’s childhood experience takes this form is the function of morally arbitrary contingency… one
who was raised in such circumstances finding it tempting and even natural when angry or frustrated to resort to
violence against others, and also finding it a much greater challenge to resist this inclination than would those with a
more fortunate upbringing” (p. 179). Dolovich, S. (2004). Legitimate punishment in liberal democracy. Buffalo
Criminal Law Review, 7(2), 307-442. doi:10.1525/nclr.2004.7.2.307.
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Since character is constituted by cognitive and motivational dispositions, Dolovich’s
arguments that speak in favor of the moral arbitrariness of propensities to commit are, at bottom,
arguments about the moral arbitrariness of the certain kinds of development of character. If one
accepts Dolovich’s reasoning then it is a matter of luck whether you turn out to be Sarah--with
her particular character--once the veil of ignorance is removed. Moreover, from behind the veil,
you would want to ensure that if you ended up being Sarah, you would be able to develop and
pursue a conception of the good, as well as develop a capacity for a sense of justice even despite
being subject to those temptations.38
Flanders builds on Dolovich’s discussion of morally arbitrary attributes. While Dolovich
focuses largely on the procedure by which individuals behind the veil of ignorance would
deliberate about the justice system, Flanders more carefully examines the results that would
follow from using that procedure. In particular, Flanders explores Rawls distributive theory of
justice in order to apply it to what he refers to as the “current crisis of criminal justice”.39
Flanders argues that Rawls’ more conservative statements on punishment are inconsistent with
his liberal ideology of distributive justice and that applying Rawls’ theory of distributive justice40
to those who commit crimes (rather than leaving those individuals out of distributive justice
entirely) illuminates ways that we can reform our justice system. Besides reminding us that41
once the veil of ignorance is lifted we could either be the victim of a crime or the object of
punishment, Flanders argues that as potential objects of punishment we would want to to ensure






maintain the level of self respect that comes from being able to pursue a conception of the good
and developing a capacity for a sense of justice. Making sure that you have the opportunity to42
pursue a conception of the good is a main goal from behind the veil and a purely retributive
system does not preserve the ability to pursue a conception of the good and a capacity for a sense
of justice as rehabilitation does. This is due to the fact that a retributive system is not sensitive to
the potential of rehabilitation and therefore may support punishments that undermine potential
rehabilitation. Harsh punishments of the sort that a retributive system might recommend impact
one’s ability to recover from said punishment and continue pursuing their conception of the
good. A Rawlsian theory of justice thus supports a rehabilitative model of punishment that takes
into account the influence of morally arbitrary attributes on an individual when assigning
consequences for a crime.
Though theoretically plausible, Dolovich and Flanders’ arguments are, as they stand, not
sufficiently empirically supported and do not speak specifically to the moral arbitrariness of the
attributes that contribute to individuals’ committing capital felonies. Individuals who are
convicted of capital crimes (crimes punishable by death) are often characterized as evil,
depraved, and ‘beyond-saving’ so understanding how morally arbitrary factors contribute to their
characters - i.e. their propensities to commit crimes - is especially important. Thus, in the next
section I will detail different morally arbitrary attributes that are characteristic of death row
inmates and how they may undermine those individual’s characters.
42 “... we can see ourselves, from behind the veil as either potential victims of crime or potential objects of
punishment... As potential objects of punishment, we should wish to avoid punishment - and the suffering attendant
to it- and we should hope that we might instead be objects of reform, so that we can better follow the principles of
justice.” Flanders, Chad. (2016). Criminals behind the Veil: Political Philosophy and Punishment, 31 BYU J. Pub.
L. 83.
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III. Morally Arbitrary Attributes that Undermine Character
Aristotle, the father of virtue ethics, discusses the development of character when
explaining the importance of moral education. Virtue ethicists argue that ‘virtues’, or for our
purpose character traits, are developed over time and therefore require the right environment and
teachers. Whether or not one is virtuous depends to some degree on moral luck - therefore43
those who are not lucky enough to grow up in an environment that encourages one to be virtuous
do not have the opportunity to develop certain virtues. Aristotle understood the influence that44
moral luck has on the development of virtues - specifically pertaining to the environment and
role models one had access to growing up. In the following subsections, I will discuss four
different circumstances of an individual's life that influence the character traits they develop and
subsequently the criminal actions that might occur as a result of those traits.
A. Past Instances of Abuse
Sharon Dolovich discusses past instances of abuse as an example of a  morally arbitrary
attribute that influences an individual's likelihood of committing a crime. The link between45
child abuse and violent and/or criminal behavior is well documented in literature and is even46
clearer when one looks closely at the number of incarcerated individuals that have experienced
child abuse, specifically those on death row.  Currie & Tekin (2006) have shown that abuse - or
46 “Extensive work in cognitive development indicates that adverse personal experiences impact the development of
cognitive structures through which individuals interpret subsequent experiences (Flavell, Miller, & Miller, 2002). In
accordance with this view, maltreated children may develop distinct maladaptive cognitive processes involving
distorted beliefs about oneself, others, and their environment, which consolidate over time and shape how they later
construe their experiences and respond in social situations (Young, Klosko, & Weishaar,2003)”. Cuadra, L. E., Jaffe,
A. E., Thomas, R., & DiLillo, D. (2014). Child maltreatment and adult criminal behavior: Does criminal thinking
explain the association? Child Abuse & Neglect, 38(8), 1399-1408. doi:10.1016/j.chiabu.2014.02.005.
45 Dolovich, S. (2004). Legitimate punishment in liberal democracy. Buffalo Criminal Law Review, 7(2), 307-442.
doi:10.1525/nclr.2004.7.2.307
44 Ibid.
43 Shafer-Landau, R. (2012). Virtue Ethics. In The Fundamentals of Ethics (2nd ed.). New York: Oxford University
Press.
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“maltreatment” as they refer to it in their writing - doubles the probability that an individual will
engage in criminal activity, and the Rochester Youth Development Study likewise found that47
abuse during childhood or adolescence increases the risk of criminal behavior in adolescence and
young adulthood. The American Psychological Association (APA) found that 94% of prison48
inmates they studied experienced physical abuse, 59% had experienced sexual abuse, and 83%
witnessed violence during their adolescent period. More generally, studies like Claussen and49
Crittenden (1991) and Deblinger et al. (1986) have shown that maltreatment may predispose
children to “risky”, “self-destructive”, or “aggressive” behaviors.50
While the studies mentioned above are concerned with general criminality, there are also
studies that focus on violent crimes worthy of capital offenses. Cunningham and Vigen (2002)
state in their piece on death row characteristics that “the presence of pathological family
interactions in the histories of capital murderers is consistent with an extensive body of research
demonstrating the role of disrupted attachment and disturbed family relationships in the etiology
of violence”. According to the U.S Department of Health & Services in their 2018 report,51
77.5% of child abuse perpetrators are the parent of the victim , so it is plausible to assume that52
52 U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, Administration for Children and Families, Administration on
Children, Youth and Families, Children’s Bureau. “Child Maltreatment 2018.” Accessed April 16, 2021.
https://www.acf.hhs.gov/cb/research-data-technology /statistics-research/child-maltreatment.
51 Cunningham, M. D., & Vigen, M. P. (2002). Death row inmate characteristics, adjustment, and confinement: A
critical review of the literature. Behavioral Sciences &amp; the Law, 20(1-2), 191-210. doi:10.1002/bsl.473.
50 “Claussen and Crittenden (1991) and Deblinger et al. (1989) document high rates of post-traumatic stress
syndrome among children who have been abused, and Widom (1994) suggests that stress during critical periods may
have an important impact on the development of aggressive behavior in adolescents”. (p. 5) Currie, Janet & Tekin,
Erdal. (2006). Does Child Abuse Cause Crime? NBER Working Paper No. w12171, Available at SSRN:
https://ssrn.com/abstract=897025.
49 National child abuse statistics from NCA. (2021, January 25). Retrieved April 06, 2021, from
https://www.nationalchildrensalliance.org/media-room/national-statistics-on-child-abuse/.
48 Cuadra, L. E., Jaffe, A. E., Thomas, R., & DiLillo, D. (2014). Child maltreatment and adult criminal behavior:
Does criminal thinking explain the association? Child Abuse & Neglect, 38(8), 1399-1408.
doi:10.1016/j.chiabu.2014.02.005.
47 Currie, Janet & Tekin, Erdal. (2006). Does Child Abuse Cause Crime? NBER Working Paper No. w12171,
Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=897025.
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some of the most traumatic abuse experiences occur inside the home. Childhood abuse is
commonly cited as an experience of those on death row. A survey of Texas death row inmates
found that 54% of respondents (22 out of 41) experienced abuse during childhood , compared to53
the national rate for children receiving investigations or alternative responses of 47.8% of
children per every 1,000.54
The research outlines above allows us to consider how maltreatment adversely affects an
individual's cognitive development (Flavell, Miller, & Miller (2002), Young, Klosko, &
Weishaar (2003), Cuadra, Jaffe, Thomas, & DiLillo, D. (2014)). This may result in an individual
being unable to accurately pinpoint a good external standard for a certain character trait. For
instance, an individual who is subject to abuse might grow up in an environment where the most
salient examples of adult ‘role models’ are models of people who abuse others. Clearly, a child in
this scenario is not able to properly judge what is ‘good’ and what is ‘bad’ (in this case, that an
abusive parent is a ‘bad’ external standard) and therefore has an improper comparison by which
to judge himself.  Without a proper external standard to judge themselves against, an individual
cannot adequately assess whether or not he meets the criteria for a certain trait. Even if there are
good external standards or role models are to some extent available in a wider community, the
individual may not be able to understand and differentiate what makes someone a ‘good’
standard because they may not be in a position to see how pro-social behaviors of the possible
role models result in beneficial and positive outcomes.
54 National child abuse statistics from NCA. (2021, January 25). Retrieved April 06, 2021, from
https://www.nationalchildrensalliance.org/media-room/national-statistics-on-child-abuse/.
53 Childhood trauma prevalent among death row inmates. (2015, July 10). Retrieved March 03, 2021, from
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/news/childhood-trauma-prevalent-among-death-row-inmates.
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The motivational component of character may also be influenced by past instances of
abuse. Even if a child can see (whether in the abstract or from a distance) the benefits of
prosocial behaviors, past abuse may undermine the motivation to pursue those behaviors by
making it seem an unattainable goal for them. A child that grew up witnessing and experiencing
abuse may not find it worthwhile to refrain from acting on a character trait that they saw
exhibited by their abuser(s). Perhaps there is no incentive for them not to continue as they always
have or they are afraid that losing a certain character trait will result in harm for them, especially
if their abuser(s) never faced negative consequences for their behavior. Or perhaps if one has not
had the experience of how beneficial it is to model a ‘good’ external standard of character, they
see less reasons for them to personally exhibit ‘good’ character traits. It is also possible that
working against old habits proves to be too difficult for some individuals, making it challenging
for them to redirect their emotional energy from those old character traits to new, prosocial ones.
For example, since Sarah was abused at home, she exhibits aggressive tendencies there as a form
of self-defense and protection. So, when she goes to school she exhibits those same aggressive
character traits. It may be difficult for her to redirect emotional energy towards halting her
aggressive tendencies at school if she continues to find them serving her interests at home.
Therefore, even if a past abuse victim does have the cognitive element of character, without the
proper motivation to form new habits and not act on old ones, they do not have the motivational
element of character.
B. Poverty
The economic status of the family one is born into is arbitrary. Whether you are born into
a wealthy family or a family that lives below the poverty line is irrelevant to your moral standing
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as an equal citizen. It is also widely accepted that your family’s economic status impacts
educational attainment, the healthcare one receives, childcare options for working parents etc.
Therefore, understanding how poverty might create specific challenges to character development
is important when determining punishments, especially when considered as an arbitrary attribute
of one’s life.
There is research to suggest that poverty influences a child’s development in more ways
than one. One example is cognitive development and abilities. Children who live below the
poverty level are more likely than other children to develop developmental delays and learning
disabilities. Korenman, Miller, & Sjaastad (1995) found that children who experienced long55
term poverty (family income averaged over thirteen years prior to the assessment) were
negatively developmentally affected in a significantly greater way than those who experienced
short term poverty. Another study by McLeod & Shanahan (1993) analyzing the impact of56
poverty on emotional and behavioral outcomes found that children experiencing a family income
below the poverty line at the time of the study experienced more “externalizing problems” like
hyperactivity, peer conflict, and headstrong behavior. Each of these issues point to the57
development of certain character traits, such as aggression or stubbornness.
One way in which learning disabilities and developmental delays may impact character58
is via the cognitive element of character. In particular, they may alter an individual’s ability to
58 Developmental delays are defined quite generally in existing literature: “A developmental delay refers to a child
who has not gained the developmental skills expected of him or her, compared to others of the same age. Delays
may occur in the areas of motor function, speech and language, cognitive, play, and social skills”. Developmental




55 Brooks-Gunn, J., & Duncan, G. (1997). The Effects of Poverty on Children. The Future of Children, 7(2), 55-71.
doi:10.2307/1602387.
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appreciate the ‘right’ reasons for displaying a particular character trait (i.e behaving in a certain
way). Individuals who suffer from developmental delays may have inaccurate perceptions of
what a ‘good’ character is as well as inaccurate perceptions of whether they themselves meet that
standard. If an individual is unable to accurately determine whether or not their behavior is in
line with a ‘good’ external standard, then they cannot properly self-revise. Take the earlier
example of Sarah. If she is unable to see that her abusive father is not a ‘good’ external standard,
then she would not take the steps to self-revise the similar character traits she had developed.
Second and perhaps even more clearly, experiencing poverty, especially for an extended
period of time (which studies like the ones above have noted as an important consideration when
analyzing the impact of poverty on development), means that the motivational component of
character may be compromised. Even if you possess the cognitive element of character
development, if you’re focused on your next meal, there is less energy to be spent on refraining
from acting on certain desires that stem from your character traits. As character is a disposition
to behave and feel in certain ways, it is important to understand that building dispositions
requires practice. One must practice constraining their desires to avoid embedding and
reinforcing them within their character. However, this is difficult to do when there are competing
external pressures. Indeed, peer conflict, noted in the aforementioned studies, is an example of a
compromised motivational element of character: as an individual experiencing poverty may not
have the motivational capacity to stop themselves from acting on a desire to participate in




One possible reason why children who live below the poverty level are more likely than
other children to develop learning disabilities and developmental delays may be because of the
sub-standard opportunities for education that are available to them. Educational attainment is
also independently correlated with crime, and capital crimes specifically. Many inmates on death
row lack the formal education that other Americans have. A 2001 study indicated that 52.3% of
death row inmates did not complete high school and 12.7% only completed up to 8th grade .59
Although people often think of education as meant to simply provide knowledge and
critical thinking skills, education also serves as an important contributor of socialization, which,
in turn, means that it serves as an important opportunity for children to develop the prosocial
dispositions associated with ‘good’ character. This subsection will focus on education as a
provider of space for socialization. Children learn how to get along with other children, how to
interact with authority figures, and other skills that offer opportunities for further cognitive,
emotional, etc. development. Through this socialization, children are introduced to different
standards of character and see which ones are rewarded and which ones are punished. For
example, a child who possesses a character trait of impatience might see another child being
rewarded in some way for patience, which causes the impatient child to reflect and recognize
patience as a ‘good’ standard of character that is rewarded. This encourages the child to practice
patience and potentially develop his own character trait of patience based on a cognitive
appreciation of ‘good’ external standards of character.
As far as the motivational element of character and education, proper schooling with
positive teachers and role models allows children to see the benefits of refraining from acting on
59 Cunningham, M. D., & Vigen, M. P. (2002). Death row inmate characteristics, adjustment, and confinement: A
critical review of the literature. Behavioral Sciences &amp; the Law, 20(1-2), 191-210. doi:10.1002/bsl.473.
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certain character traits (and subsequent desires) as beneficial and desirable. It may be the case
that a child is less likely to appreciate the ‘right’ reasons for acting in certain ways due to a lack
of experience with ‘good’ external standard of character at home. Education provides a specific
opportunity for children to practice devoting emotional energy towards meeting ‘good’ character
standards that they may not find in other areas of their life, such as at home.
D. Intellectual Development
Intellectual development is another characteristic of an individual that is not within their
own control. The trajectory and maximum development of an individual’s intellectual capacities
is a morally arbitrary attribute. In order for a person to be considered mentally disabled they
must meet these three criteria: an Intelligence Quotient (I.Q) score of 70 or below, difficulty
coping with the everyday world, and a manifestation of the disability prior to adulthood.60
However, this definition of intellectual disabilities fails to take into account that disabilities can
manifest in many different ways that may look different than the three criteria mentioned above.
While it is true that disabilities can be indicated through I.Q scores, they are not always61
predictive of a mental ability as some individuals with I.Q scores above 70 may still have lower62
levels of cognitive ability or development.63
63 “This group of people with intellectual disability who have higher IQs constitute about 80% to 90% of all
individuals with intellectual disability. (Intellectual disability is used to address the same population of individuals as
the term mental retardation [Schalock et al., 2007].)” Snell, M. E., Luckasson, R., Borthwick-Duffy, W. S., Bradley,
V., Buntinx, W. H., Coulter, D. L., . . . Yeager, M. H. (2009). Characteristics and needs of people with intellectual
disability who have higher iqs. Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities, 47(3), 220-233.
doi:10.1352/1934-9556-47.3.220.
62 Ibid.
61 According to the American Association of Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities, the definition of
intellectual ability is as follows: “Intellectual disability is a disability characterized by significant limitations in both
intellectual functioning and in adaptive behavior, which covers many everyday social and practical skills. This
disability originates before the age of 22”. Definition of intellectual disability. (n.d.). Retrieved March 20, 2021,
from https://www.aaidd.org/intellectual-disability/definition.
60 Intellectual disability and the death penalty. (n.d.). Retrieved March 03, 2021, from
https://www.aclu.org/other/intellectual-disability-and-death-penalty.
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Studies on intellectual disabilities and moral development have compared individuals
with intellectual disabilities’ cognitive development with other individuals’ cognitive
development .  These studies have shown that children with intellectual disabilities might not64
develop through the stages of moral reasoning as fast as other children can and that they may not
even reach more advanced levels of moral development. It is clear that cognitive development65
and moral development are linked. It is also plausible to assume that lower levels of cognitive
and moral development may pose challenges for an individual’s ability to initially appreciate the
‘right’ reasons for feeling or behaving in a certain way, and therefore one is less likely to possess
the cognitive element of character. It is also possible that individuals with lower levels of
cognitive and moral development find it difficult to be motivated by those ‘right’ reasons, even if
they are able to recognize the existence of those reasons. This would result in a missing
motivational component of character.
IV. Conclusion
However we resolve disagreements about moral responsibility, we can at least agree that
there are many factors that are likely to contribute to crime that are morally arbitrary in the sense
of not being relevant to our moral standing as equal citizens. As discussed above, these include
past instances of abuse, poverty, educational attainment, and intellectual ability. Therefore, they
65 Ibid.
64 “Moral reasoning refers to the cognitive and emotional processes occurring within a person when they are
attempting to determine whether or not an event is morally ‘‘right or wrong”... Regardless of the theoretical view
that is adopted, moral development refers to the changes that occur to the structure of moral reasoning with
increasing maturity, both as a consequence of social perspective-taking and increasing cognitive ability”. (p. 274)
Langdon, P. E., Clare, I. C., & Murphy, G. H. (2010). Developing an understanding of the
literature relating to the moral development of people with intellectual disabilities. Developmental Review, 30(3),
273-293. doi:10.1016/j.dr.2010.01.001.
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would not be known characteristics from behind the veil of ignorance. This encourages a
rehabilitative model of punishment over a purely punitive model of punishment, as the potential
for an individual to be an object of punishment once the veil is lifted requires individuals to
ensure a punishment model that preserves people’s ability to develop and pursue their
conceptions of the good and capacities for justice. It is controversial what rehabilitation might
involve. Perhaps it is access to mental health services, community service, or furthering
educational opportunities. Regardless, it is evident that the death penalty would not meet any
standard of rehabiltion that would be set from behind the veil of ignorance because of the
severity of death as a punishemnt and the lack of potential for recoverability for those subjected




I. Utilitarian Objections to Dolovich and Flanders
Whereas I have so far argued that a Rawlsian should be primarily interested in
rehabilitating people who are guilty of criminal defenses, a utilitarian might focus more on
deterrence. Utilitarians subscribe to the principle of equal consideration of interests (PEC) which
calls for equal weight to be given to all persons’ interests affected by one's actions in order to
maximize happiness. The PEC holds that one ‘unit’ of happiness is equal to another singular66
unit of happiness, no matter where or who the units of happiness come from, and so one gains
moral reasons to take an action to the extent that that action promotes maximal happiness.
Policies of deterrence maximize happiness, and so fall in line with utilitarian
recommendations, if the interests of individuals who want to be protected from crime outweigh
the interests of those who want to be protected from punishment. By serving as a deterrent,
punishment would encourage people to be cautious about acting on desires and character traits
that may be influenced by the kind of attributes in the previous chapter (i.e the ‘morally
arbitrary’ attributes of past instances of abuse, educational attainment, etc.). More people would67
be able to better maximize happiness in a society where punishments incentivize good behavior.
Rehabilitation might play some role in punishment but full focus on rehabilitation might
undermine deterrence by not being harsh enough to discourage certain behaviors. Therefore, a
utilitarian might argue that limits on rehabilitation are needed. A utilitarian might argue that
punishment encourages people to be more mindful of their character. In particular, the death
penalty serves as a deterrent for the most heinous crimes, specifically murder, and encourages
67 Dolovich, S. (2004). Legitimate punishment in liberal democracy. Buffalo Criminal Law Review, 7(2), 307-442.
doi:10.1525/nclr.2004.7.2.307.
66 Singer, P. (2017). Chapter 1: About Ethics. In Practical ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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those who may partake in violent and potentially fatal behaviors against others may be deterred
by a severe punishment like the death penalty.
Rawls was not a utilitarian, but some utilitarian considerations might also come up
behind the veil of ignorance. In the last chapter, I argued against the death penalty on the basis of
reasoning that takes place behind the veil of ignorance. However, I focused on the perspective of
a person who commits a crime, rather than a victim. Although it is possible that you might be
Sarah in society, you could also potentially be Sarah’s boyfriend. As Sarah’s boyfriend, you
would want Sarah to be deterred from killing you in the first place. Consequences are a major
potential deterrent, therefore individuals might choose to put them in place from behind the veil
of ignorance to ensure that society discourages and attempts to prevent crimes. Again, to the
extent that rehabilitation undermines deterrence, this would speak in favor of moving away from
rehabilitation and towards a more purely punitive approach. Some of the same concerns that are
raised by utilitarians about happiness relate to Rawls’ concerns about people’s ability to pursue
their conceptions of the good. Specifically, from behind the veil of ignorance Rawlsians are
concerned with one’s interest in being able to pursue their conception of the good in the same
way that utilitarians are concerned with one's interest in maximizing happiness.
How far should we lean towards a punitive approach? Rawlsians would not accept a fully
utilitarian approach because of the influence that morally arbitrary attributes have on a person’s
character (and therefore their propensity to commit a crime). As these attributes are not relevant
to one’s equal moral standing as a citizen, they would not factor into decisions from behind the
veil. However, when there is ambiguity about how much of a person’s character is due to morally
arbitrary attributes, it’s possible that reasoners behind the veil of ignorance might begin to
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consider the tradeoff between deterrence and rehabilitation, given the benefits on the other side
of avoiding being a victim. Someone influenced by utilitarian thinking and considering the veil
of ignorance may argue that even though you would not want totally ‘innocent’ people
(‘innocent’ including those who committed crimes as a result of morally arbitrary attributes)
sentenced to death, erring on the side of punitive punishment in ambiguous cases might be worth
it. In particular, this person might argue that the practical problems associated with calculating a
person’s mitigated consequences based on the influence of morally arbitrary attributes over the
crime they committed is not feasible. It is costly and practically impossible to come up with a
necessary formula to determine the influence of morally arbitrary attributes on an individual’s
character. On top of that, there is the reality that finding out the information that is needed for
completing the relevant calculations would be very invasive, which would lead to personal
privacy issues. Given the inevitable ambiguity that follows from this and the benefits of
deterrence, individuals behind the veil of ignorance may err on the side of doling out punitive
punishments in ambiguous cases even if there's some chance that morally arbitrary attributes
influenced someone’s character.
Even if we err on the side of punitive accountability, we would need to balance the
utilitarian considerations expressed above with considerations of harshness and recoverability.
Perhaps behind the veil of ignorance we would want punishments for their deterrence value to
some extent and so allow some punishments that served that purpose, rather than purely
rehabilitative purposes.  Nevertheless, we would not want the harshness of a punishment to be so
severe that we could not recover from it. This is because such punishments would unduly
interfere with people’s ability to pursue a conception of the good and develop a sense of justice,
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and these are core things we’d want to protect from behind the veil of ignorance. Pursuing a
conception of the good and developing a capacity for a sense of justice create a basis for
self-respect that individuals from behind the veil desire. Less harsh punishments, like community
service or a fine, are easy to recover from and so - even if they do not actively promote
rehabilitation - do not interfere unduly with an individual's ability to pursue their conception of
the good or develop their capacity for a sense of justice. However, some harsher punishments
imposed for the sake of deterrence may not lend individuals in society the same opportunities.
Instead, it negatively impacts an individual's ability to pursue a conception of the good by
decreasing the likelihood of recoverability. Recoverability as I discuss it refers to the ability for
one to ‘bounce back’ from a punishment, or more specifically the ability for one to continue
pursuing their conception of the good and capacity for a sense of justice after being punished. If
someone is unable to recover from a punishment (which is the case with harsher punishments)
then they would be concerned about not retaining a basis for self-respect.
There may be debate about what sorts of punishment would qualify as “too harsh”. For
instance, someone might argue that five extra years of imprisonment for Sarah is permissible,
while someone else might find those extra years too harsh . However, the death penalty would
certainly qualify as “too harsh”, as by definition death implies no recovery. Thus, even a
Rawlsian influenced by utilitarian considerations would reject the death penalty. My thesis
focuses specifically on the death penalty due to the fact that it is an especailly obvious case of
harsh punishment.
II. Limits of Deterrence Value
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Potentially there may be some cases that allow a certain level of punishment for
deterrence value, but as I’ve argued - so long as one stays behind the veil of ignorance -
punishment would be constrained by recoverability. But what if one completely rejects a
Rawlsian framework and favors a straight utilitarian line of thinking? Then maybe there would
be a stronger argument for using the death penalty to deter capital crimes. After all, sentencing
one person to death only needs to deter one killing in order to be successful on balance and only
two to make it worthwhile. However, this argument only works to the extent that one has a
capacity for self-correction. Those who have the ability to recognize and revise aspects of their
character that are deemed undesirable or problematic are able to respond to deterrents. For
example, let us assume that I have the capacity for self-correction. I am aware that stealing is
wrong, however I am also aware that if I am caught stealing I could potentially face legal
consequences. A legal consequence, say a fine, acts as a deterrent in this case since it encourages
me not to partake in stealing. My capacity for self-correction is what allows the deterrent to have
a successful effect on me. I am able to recognize that I want to avoid the punishment that would
stem from acting on my desires, and so I self-revise. The integration of a desire to avoid
punishment and an appreciation of the right reasons for doing so enables me to respond to the
deterrent by self-correcting the problematic desire.
Take our previous example of Sam and Sarah: Sam, like myself, is able to reflect on his
aggressive tendencies and the desires that stem from them and self-revise this character trait.
Specifically, he is able to recognize and appreciate the ‘right’ reasons for needing to self-revise
his aggressive tendencies and self-correct in the direction of less aggressive character traits.
However, if I did not have a capacity for self-correction (like Sarah) I may be either unable to
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recognize that reacting aggressively towards others is problematic or I can recognize my
aggression as problematic but I am unable to resist reacting aggressively. Therefore, even though
I know that there are consequences/ punishments for acting aggressively towards a partner or
friend, my lack of capacity for self reflection renders me unable to respond to those deterrents.
In the next section, I will argue that the majority of individuals on death row in the
United States at this time do not have the capacity for self-correction that is necessary for
deterrence to be effective. There is a body of research that catalogs demographic and historical
data on death row inmates. As I discussed in the previous chapter, this data reveals that death
row inmates face challenges that undermine the initial development of ‘good’ character. Next, I
will suggest that those difficulties also undermine death row inmates’ capacity to self-correct
‘bad’ character.  For instance, a study on juvenile death row inmates revealed that many of them
dealt with neurological dysfunction and psychiatric symptoms as well as histories of physcial
and sexual abuse which might plausibly undermine their capacities for effective self-correction.68
I consider this and related information in the next section.
III. The Capacity for Self-Correction and Deterrence
To the extent that there is a justification for the death penalty, it would be deterrence
value. However as discussed in the last section, deterrence is not likely to work for individuals
who do not have the capacity for self-correction. In this section, I illustrate how current death
row inmates in the United States are not likely to possess a sufficient capacity for self-correction
as a result of various challenges that they have faced over the course of their lives. I conclude
68 Cunningham, M. D., & Vigen, M. P. (2002). Death row inmate characteristics, adjustment, and confinement: A
critical review of the literature. Behavioral Sciences &amp; the Law, 20(1-2), 191-210. doi:10.1002/bsl.473.
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that the death penalty punishment is apt to be ineffective at deterring crimes for the individuals
concerned, and as a result does not provide proper justification for executing death row inmates.
I will explore some of the same characteristics that were discussed in the previous
chapter: past instances of abuse, educational attainment, and intellectual ability. Other
characteristics may also play into death row inmates lacking the capacity for self-correction,
however I will focus on these four considerations due to the large bodies of research already
available to properly discuss them.
The trait of being able to revise one’s character is a ‘meta’ character trait that has both a
cognitive element and the motivational element. It is important to distinguish between character
traits and ‘meta’ character traits at this point. Character traits, as mentioned before, are
dispositions to act, think, and feel in certain ways. Examples of character traits are aggression
(Sarah’s case), selfishness, generosity, and patience. A ‘meta’ character trait is not a character
trait in the same way aggression is as it is not necessarily a ‘disposition’, however it is composed
of a cognitive and motivational elemental that function similarly to the cognitive and
motivational elements of character discussed in the first two chapters.
To say that one does not have ‘good’ character means that the individual does not
recognize or appreciate the ‘right’ reasons for doing something or is not being motivated by the
‘right’ reasons. To say that one does not have the capacity for self-correction means that the
individual does not have access to the ‘right’ reasons for doing something or is not able to gain
the motivation necessary to act on the ‘right’ reasons. So in both cases, it is not just that you are
not inclined to see the right reasons or standards, but rather that circumstances may create
“tunnel vision”, so to speak, which essentially removes the possibility of one being able to see
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the ‘right’ reasons. The cognitive element of self-correction requires that one be able
conceptualize a good external standard by which to judge oneself and to recognize whether or
not one meets that external standard. To have the motivational element of this meta-character
trait, one must have the emotional energy to close the gap between oneself and the external
standard once it is found that one does not meet said external standard. For example, say there is
a standard for being polite (perhaps it includes saying please and thank you, chewing with your
mouth closed, etc.) and I am able to judge myself against that standard. This is the cognitive
element of self-correction. If I find that I do not meet the standard of politeness, then I must work
to meet that standard, which requires paying attention to how I am acting, fighting against old
habits, and perhaps practicing chewing with my mouth closed or reminding myself to say please.
Doing these things requires a certain level of emotional energy directed towards them. This is the
motivational element of self-correction. Together, both the cognitive and motivational elements
allow me to self-correct myself to the desired outcome, in this case politeness. To the extent that
one lacks one or both of these elements, one lacks the capacity for self-correction.
A. Past Instances of Abuse
The studies on abuse mentioned in the previous chapter show a correlation: they suggest
that many death row inmates - who are people who were not in fact deterred by the death penalty
- were also people who experienced abuse. We can hypothesize about a more specific causal69
connection between individuals on death row and past instances of abuse that involves the lack
of a capacity for self-correction. As far as the cognitive element of self-correction, there are two
factors at play. For one thing, many people look up to their parents as good external standards of
69 Childhood trauma prevalent among death row inmates. (2015, July 10). Retrieved March 03, 2021, from
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/news/childhood-trauma-prevalent-among-death-row-inmates.
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love and kindness. However, an individual who was abused by his parent(s) cannot use them as a
“good” external standard for love and kindness. Therefore, he is unable to accurately assess
whether or not he lives up to the standard for love and kindness. Without an external standard
and the recognition of where one falls short, self-correction is not possible. Not only are
individuals unable to develop these ‘good’ character traits initially, but they also lose resources
that are necessary in order to recognize the problem with failing to develop those good character
traits.
Perhaps an individual who suffered abuse was able to acquire the cognitive element of
self-correction; they still may not have the motivational element of self-correction. The
motivational element of self-correction, or the emotional energy a person has to act on her
assessments of external standards for behavior, can be hindered by experiences of abuse. While
the relationship between past instances of abuse and certain character traits is more clear based
on the present research, it is plausible to think that maltreatment may affect the development of
the ‘meta’ character trait of self-correction, either cognitively or motivationally.
Abuse alters the cognitive and motivational processes of an individual to a degree where
the capacity for self-correction may not be developed or acted upon. Since many death row
inmates experience abuse, they may lack the capacity for self-correction, whether cognitively,
motivationally, or both. Therefore, child abuse is a characteristic of an individual’s life that
renders a deterrence justification for the death penalty unjustified, as it hinders an individual’s
ability to develop a capcity for self-correction.
B. Educational Attainment
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The connection between education and cognitive development detailed in the previous
section may also contribute to the development of self-correction. Death row inmates who have
little formal education may not have been in a school environment that encouraged conformance
with good external standards (through teachers, principals, other students, etc.) or never
expressed the importance of evaluating one’s own character against those standards. A child who
behaves poorly in class is often reprimanded by the teacher or faces some other consequence that
teaches them what behaviors are acceptable and which are unacceptable. Then, that child has the
opportunity to reflect on the consequence they received and compare their situation to a ‘good’
external standard that did not receive that consequence. Finally, they recognize the changes they
must make (whether to their character or otherwise) in order to avoid that punishment in the
future. This represents the cognitive element of self-correction. This example shows how
someone without access to a good education might have difficulty self-correcting.
The motivational element of self-correction is influenced by positive feedback from peers
or teachers for prosocial behaviors like self-revision. This motivates children to also direct
emotional energy towards self-revising less socially desirable behaviors and modeling good
external standards. A death row inmate without this educational experience may not have the
proper motivation to direct their emotional energy towards self-correction, even if they have the
cognitive element of self-correction. Even if they are able to comprehend on an abstract level
that self-correction is good, if they do not have experience with the benefits of self-correction (in




The capacity for self-correction acts as a ‘meta’ character trait that is acquired through
the development of moral reasoning and an individual’s progression through the stages of moral
development. Without moral reasoning , I am unable to envision what my character should look70
like (or perhaps I am even unable to comprehend that there is a specific character that I should
aspire to). Therefore, as individuals with intellectual disabilities have lower levels of cognitive
development and therefore moral reasoning, they may not develop the cognitive element of
self-correction.
Studies have also shown that some executed death row inmates had IQ scores that
suggest mild retardation . The fact that many individuals on death row have below average IQ71
scores and show signs of intellectual impairments poses an issue for their capacity for
self-correction. As with death row inmates who have experienced abuse or lack education, death
row inmates with lower intellectual abilities may not be able to recognize what qualifies as a
good external standard. Therefore they do not possess the cognitive element of self-correction.
Without the cognitive element of self-correction, an individual cannot know that they should or
could be directing emotional energy to revising a certain element of one's character. As many
death row inmates with lower intellectual abilities may not have the cognitive element of
character and therefore the ability to conceptualize an external model to judge oneself against,
they may not have the motivational element of character.
71 Cunningham, M. D., & Vigen, M. P. (2002). Death row inmate characteristics, adjustment, and confinement: A
critical review of the literature. Behavioral Sciences &amp; the Law, 20(1-2), 191-210. doi:10.1002/bsl.473.
70 Moral reasoning as defined by the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, “... moral reasoning as a species of
practical reasoning – that is, as a type of reasoning directed towards deciding what to do and, when successful,
issuing in an intention… we may understand issues about what is right or wrong, or virtuous or vicious, as raising




Whether one is an incompatibilist or a compatibilist, a utilitarian or a Rawlsian, one has
reason to think that the influence of ‘arbitrary’ factors on the development and capacity to
self-correct our characters. The implications of my thesis point towards moving the United States
in the direction of a less punitive criminal justice system. While exactly what reforms are
necessary to properly incorporate rehabilitation into the U.S criminal justice are outside of the
realm of this thesis, the claims made give rise to an important question: Is mitigating punishment
on the basis of difficult life circumstances that influence character a matter of justice or of
mercy?
Presently, many people argue that considering the difficult life circumstances of an
offender in capital cases, which is what my thesis argues for, is an act of mercy on the part of the
sentencer. Upon considering the question of whether the death penalty constitutes cruel and
unusual punishment in cases where mitigating evidence has been introduced, Supreme Court
Justice Antonin Scalia answered no and continued on to say, “I don’t think my Court is
authorized to say, oh, it would be a good idea to have every jury be able to consider mitigating
evidence and grant mercy…”. Here, Scalia directly attributes the consideration of mitigating72
circumstances as an act of  “mercy”. However, is that the proper attitude our judges and criminal
justice system more broadly should hold?
In order to answer this question, let’s take a look at Sarah again. Sarah experienced
traumatic abuse at the hands of her father which influenced her development of aggressive
tendencies that resulted in her killing her boyfriend. Sarah’s case is tried in front of a jury and
72 Randall, K. (2002, July 5). US Supreme Court Justice Scalia on capital punishment: "death is no big deal".
Retrieved April 16, 2021, from https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2002/07/scal-j05.html.
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that jury decides not to take the mitigating evidence of the abuse Sarah suffered into account
when deliberating her sentence. Is this a just way of deciding Sarah’s punishment? Should
integral experiences in Sarah’s life be cast aside as an optional consideration for a jury? It is my
contention that that would be unjust, particularly because every theory that we have discussed
thus far has suggested that it is a matter of justice. Justice is an action that is required whereas
mercy, by its very definition, is a voluntary act on the part of the decision maker. The theories
and conclusions described in my thesis do not suggest that consideration of an individual's
challenging life circumstances is optional, rather they suggest that considering these elements are
imperative when implementing a theory of punishment in a just society.
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